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Abstract
This paper discusses inequality orderings based explicitly on clos-
ing up of income gaps, demonstrating the links between these and
other orderings, the classes of functions preserving the orderings and
applications showing their usefulness in comparison of economic poli-
cies.
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1Executive Summary 
 
It is a truism to say that inequality is about gaps between incomes and that reducing 
inequality is about closing these gaps up. 
 
Common means of comparison between income distributions all use criteria which do 
show inequality as falling when gaps close.  However explicitly asking whether the 
gaps reduce throughout the whole distribution in concertina-like fashion is a rare 
criterion to apply.  This paper seeks to investigate the related orderings.  The most 
common criteria for inequality comparison are those based on Lorenz curves, made 
plausible most persuasively as indicators of inequality by their link to progressive 
transfers of income.   Progressive transfers are often seen, since the arguments of 
Pigou and Dalton, as uncontentiously inequality reducing but this view could be 
challenged if there are more than two people.  A transfer from the top to the middle of 
the income distribution reduces inequality between the top and the middle but 
increases it between the middle and the bottom.  Regarding inequality as having fallen 
overall involves giving priority to the former effect - the effect on the gap between 
incomes of those involved directly in the transfer - for which there may be good 
reason, but it is not obvious that it would not be sensible to say inequality simply 
could not be compared.   A minor function of the current paper is to bring some 
overlooked but highly germane mathematical literature to the attention of inequality 
theorists.  The major function, though, is to tell a rounded story about the ratio and 
difference dominance concepts, and associated orderings and welfare properties. 1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
It is a truism to say that inequality is about gaps between incomes and
that reducing inequality is about closing these gaps up. Common means
of comparison between income distributions all use criteria which do show
inequality as falling when gaps close. However explicitly asking whether the
gaps reduce throughout the whole distribution in concertina-like fashion is a
rare criterion to apply. This paper seeks to investigate the related orderings.
The most common criteria for inequality comparison are those based on
Lorenz curves, made plausible most persuasively as indicators of inequality
by their link to progressive transfers of income. Progressive transfers are
often seen, since the arguments of Pigou (1912) and Dalton (1920), as un-
contentiously inequality reducing but this view could be challenged if there
are more than two people. A transfer from the top to the middle of the
income distribution1 reduces inequality between the top and the middle but
increases it between the middle and the bottom2. Regarding inequality as
having fallen overall involves giving priority to the former e®ect - the e®ect
on the gap between incomes of those involved directly in the transfer - for
which there may be good reason, but it is not obvious that it would not be
sensible to say inequality simply could not be compared3.
What convinces Dalton (1920) is the link to welfare - he is \primarily
interested, not in the distribution as such, but in the e®ects of the distribution
of income upon the distribution and total amount of economic welfare, which
may be derived from income (p.348)". That such transfers raise welfare is well
known to be true in a typical utilitarian setting if individual welfare depends
only upon own income but if income gaps matter to individual welfare then
this need not be so. This issue is taken up below and links between economic
welfare and the orderings based explicitly on gaps are considered.
The earliest discussions of these orderings can be found outside the eco-
nomic context (for example in Marshall, Olkin and Proschan (1967) and Bar-
1Progressive transfers are sometimes called Robin Hood transfers. The Robin Hood of
legend stole from the rich to give to the poor. Noone would disagree that that reduces
inequality. He never, however, stole from the rich to give to the middle or stole from the
middle to give the poor.
2Blum and Kalven (1953), for example, discuss income redistribution in this sort of
way.
3One might raise a similar objection to Sen's (1976, 1978) strengthened criterion for
comparisons of ordinal inequality for cases of more than two persons - STOIC. Recognising
this makes it clearer why he ¯nds a link with Lorenz dominance.
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low and Proschan (1975)). There are some useful papers from this period
which are less well known than perhaps they should be and a minor function
of the current paper is to bring some overlooked but highly germane mathe-
matical literature to the attention of inequality theorists. I think particularly
here of Marshall, Walkup and Wets (1967) which anticipates several results
of this paper4.
The major function, though, is to tell a rounded story about the ratio and
di®erence dominance concepts, and associated orderings and welfare prop-
erties, which extend the well-known Lorenz ordering in di®erent ways. In
this, I am in fact taking up again some work which I engaged in some time
ago (Preston 1989, 1990a, 1990b) and ideas which have been developed by
Moyes (1994) on the "dominance in relative di®erentials" and "dominance
in absolute di®erentials" concepts, for which he coined those terminologies,
and by Zheng (2006). The style and manner of development, in the sequel,
is intended to be somewhat in similar fashion to the way in which Rothschild
and Stiglitz's (1973) paper developed a rounded story for the Lorenz order-
ing, which had been begun by Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970) (see also
Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett 1973).
Section 2 de¯nes the orderings and considers relations between them.
Section 3 outlines classes of functions which preserve the orderings. Section
4 considers how policies map underlying variation into distributions which
may be related according to the orderings. Section 5 concludes.
2 Dominance orderings
2.1 Inequality
2.1.1 Orderings on Rn
It is convenient to de¯ne inequality orderings on income vectors which have
been placed in order from poorest to richest. To that end let Dn = fx 2
Rn j xi+1 ¸ xi; for i = 1;:::;n ¡ 1g and Dn
+ = fx 2 Rn j xi+1 ¸ xi; ;xi >
0 for i = 1;:::;n ¡ 1g = Dn \ Rn
+ denote spaces of ordered vectors.
The two crucial orderings of interest for this paper are de¯ned by closing
up of all gaps in relative or absolute terms.
4I am myself grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing the pertinence of this paper
and its precedence in proving certain results to my attention.
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De¯nition 1 (a) Say that x di®erence dominates y, written x %A y, i®
xi+1 ¡ xi · yi+1 ¡ yi for i = 1;:::;n ¡ 1 and x; y 2 Dn.
(b) Say that x ratio dominates y, written x %R y, i® ln(xi+1) ¡ ln(xi) ·
ln(yi+1) ¡ ln(yi) for i = 1;:::;n ¡ 1 and x; y 2 Dn
+.
If x di®erence dominates y then all absolute gaps are smaller and if x ratio
dominates y then all relative gaps are smaller. Both orderings are discussed
in Marshall, Walkup and Wets (1967) where they are treated as special cases
of cone orderings5.
These orderings go by di®erent names. Moyes (1994) refers to dominance
in absolute and relative di®erentials. Zheng (2006) refers to absolute and
ratio di®erential conditions. In the absence of unanimity on any alternative
terminology, I keep to that used in Preston (1990a).
Ratio and di®erence dominance can obviously be nested as special cases
within a more general class of orderings requiring the closing up of gaps in
the value of any increasing function of incomes, say U. Zheng (2006) makes
this generalisation, de¯ning a more general class of utility gap orderings. If
we choose U(x) = ln(x + ¹) with ¹ 2 R+ then we get a class of orderings
which will give ratio and di®erence dominance as extreme cases, in line with
the treatment of intermediate orderings in Kolm (1976a, b)6.
It is also useful to have de¯nitions of transformations of vectors which do
not change inequality. In absolute terms all gaps are maintained by a parallel
shift in a vector, called a translation, and all relative gaps by multiplying all
incomes by a positive constant, referred to here as a rescaling. Let en 2 Rn
+
denote the vector all elements of which are unity.
5x and y are cone ordered if the di®erence between them lies in a speci¯ed convex cone.
If x %A y or x %R y, for example, then the di®erences between the absolute or relative
gaps in the two vectors lie in the particular cone de¯ned by the nonnegative orthant.
Majorisation, discussed below, is also a cone ordering. This is a framework which yields
useful insights but we do not adopt it here.
6Kolm regards the view that equal absolute increases in income preserve inequality as
\leftist" and the view that equal proportional increases preserve inequality as \rightist".
This categorisation could be questioned, particularly if we consider the implications for
views on decreases rather than increases in income. Is it more leftist to think that equal
absolute cuts in income, as through a poll tax, preserve inequality? While it seems certainly
true that the leftist would prefer a given positive sum to be distributed through equal
absolute increases than through equal proportional ones it is not obvious that this re°ects
a view about how inequality should be measured.
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De¯nition 2 (a) Say that x is a translation of y i® xi = yi + ¸; i =
1;:::;n or more simply x = y + ¸en for some ¸ 2 R and x; y 2 Dn.
(b) Say that x is a rescaling of y i® xi = ¸yi; i = 1;:::;n, or more simply
x = ¸y for some ¸ 2 R+ and x; y 2 Dn
+.
We can link the inequality orderings de¯ned above to changes in income
vectors which do unambiguously close up gaps.
De¯nition 3 (a) Say that x is an absolute lower end elevation of y i®, for
some k and some ¸ > 0, xi = yi + ¸ for i = 1;:::;k and xi = yi for
i = k + 1;:::;n with x; y 2 Dn.
(b) Say that x is a relative lower end elevation of y i®, for some k and
some ¸ > 1, xi = ¸yi for i = 1;:::;k and xi = yi for i = k + 1;:::;n
with x; y 2 Dn
+
Combining absolute or relative lower end elevations with translations or
rescalings are the only ways to secure di®erence or ratio dominance. We state
this formally.
Theorem 1 (a) x %A y i® x can be obtained from y by a ¯nite series of
absolute lower end elevations and a translation.
(b) x %R y i® x can be obtained from y by a ¯nite series of relative lower
end elevations and a rescaling.
Proof of Theorem 1.
(a) Su±ciency follows from the facts that any lower end elevation reduces
absolute gaps for i = 1;:::;k and leaves them unchanged for i =
k + 1;:::;n whereas any translation leaves absolute gaps unchanged.
To see necessity, suppose x %A y. Then x can be obtained from y by a
series of n ¡ 1 absolute lower end elevations, where the kth lower end
elevation raises yi by yk+1 ¡ yk ¡ xk+1 + xk ¸ 0 for i = 1;:::;k, and a
translation by xn ¡ yn.
(b) The result follows from the above given that x %R y i® ln(x) %A ln(y).
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Di®erence and ratio dominance are stronger inequality concepts than
those prevalent in the literature. Since Pigou (1912) and, especially, Dal-
ton (1920) it has been widely accepted that inequality is reduced by a sort of
change which can not necessarily be reduced to changes of the sort discussed
above.
De¯nition 4 Say that x can be obtained from y by an (elementary) progres-
sive transfer7 if, for some k and some ¸ > 0, xk = yk + ¸, xk+1 = yk+1 ¡ ¸
and xi = yi; i = 1;:::;k ¡ 1;k + 2;:::;n and x; y 2 Dn (Muirhead 1903,
Pigou 1912, Dalton 1920).
Well known results link progressive transfers to the most widely accepted
criterion for inequality comparison, that of Lorenz dominance.





i=1[xi ¡ yi] = 0 and x; y 2 Dn.
The Lorenz ordering is equivalent to a relation known as majorisation
(Marshall and Olkin 1979) which is widely used outside of economic contexts.
A famous result establishes that x %L y i® x can be obtained from y by a ¯nite
series of progressive transfers (Hardy, Littlewood and P¶ olya 1934, Atkinson
1970). The Lorenz ordering can be extended to comparisons which do not
involve equal means by allowing progressive transfers to be combined with
translations and rescalings.
De¯nition 6 (a) Say that x absolute Lorenz dominates y, written x %L
A y,
i® x %L y + ¸en for some ¸ (Shorrocks 1983, Moyes 1987).
(b) Say that x relative Lorenz dominates y, written x %L
R y, i® x %L ¸y
for some ¸ > 0 (Lorenz 1905).
7Progressive transfers are sometimes de¯ned as any transfers from richer to poorer
individuals, not necessarily next to each other in the ordering of incomes. The term
\elementary progressive transfer" is from Arnold (1987).
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2.1.2 Orderings on distributions
We can also de¯ne analogous orderings more generally on spaces of distri-
bution functions or, equivalently, quantile functions. Such a setting clearly
subsumes that of the earlier section, allowing for comparison of income vec-
tors of di®erent dimensions but also of inequality in continuous distributions.
Let D denote the space of nondecreasing functions from [0;1] to R and
D+ denote the space of nondecreasing functions from [0;1] to R+. Let DC
denote the space of di®erentiable, nondecreasing functions from [0;1] to R
and DC
+ denote the space of di®erentiable, nondecreasing functions from [0;1]
to R+.
If x is distributed according to distribution function Fx : R ! [0;1], let
»x : [0;1] ! R be the corresponding quantile function, or inverse distribution
function, de¯ned by »x(p) = supfx j Fx(x) · pg.
We can now de¯ne the corresponding orderings de¯ned on distributions.
De¯nition 7 (a) Say that Fx %A Fy i® »x(p) ¡ »y(p) is nonincreasing for
p 2 [0;1] and »x; »y 2 D
(b) Say that Fx %R Fy i® ln(»x(p))¡ln(»y(p)) is nonincreasing for p 2 [0;1]
and »x; »y 2 D+.
Marshall, Olkin and Proschan (1967) and Barlow and Proschan (1975) say
that Fx is star-shaped with respect to Fy if »y(Fx(x))=x is increasing. Arnold
de¯nes an ordering identical to %R which he calls star-shaped ordering, star
ordering or simply ¤-ordering.
Suppose that the distributions under comparison and their inverses are
di®erentiable with associated densities fx and fy. Then »0
x(p) = 1=fx(F ¡1
x (p))
so that Fx %A Fy i® fx(»x(p)) ¸ fy(»y(p)) for p 2 [0;1].
We can also de¯ne absolute and relative Lorenz curves using the quantile



















and thus de¯ne Lorenz orderings
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De¯nition 8 (a) Say that Fx %L
A Fy i® LA
x(q) ¸ LA
y (q) for all q 2 [0;1]
and »x; »y 2 D
(b) Say that Fx %L
R Fy i® LR
x(q) ¸ LR
y (q) for all q 2 [0;1] and »x; »y 2 D+.
2.1.3 Relations between orderings
The fact that di®erence and ratio dominance imply but are not implied by
absolute and relative Lorenz dominance is long established.
Theorem 2 (Marshall, Olkin and Proschan 1967; Marshall, Walkup and
Wets 1967; Jakobsson 1979; Thon 1987; Arnold 1987)
(a) If x %A y then x%
L
Ay.
(b) If x %R y then x%
L
Ry.
(c) If Fx %A Fy then Fx%
L
AFy.
(d) If Fx %R Fy then Fx%
L
RFy.
The point is that an absolute or relative lower end elevation can always
be implemented by a translation or rescaling followed by a ¯nite series of
progressive transfers. A lower end elevation obviously raises mean income.
Consider a translation or rescaling which leads to the same increase in mean
income and following this by redistributing the income increase to those at
the lower end by transferring the income gains at the top end down the
distribution to those at the bottom.
It is not possible on the other hand to implement a progressive transfer by
a series of lower end elevations and translations or rescalings. A progressive
transfer anywhere other than at the extremes of the distribution raises some
income gaps at the same time as it reduces others and we have shown that
lower end elevations cannot raise income gaps.
We can illustrate the relation between these orderings by showing areas
of dominance in comparisons within the standard simplex as in Sen (1973)
and many later papers. Imagine looking down at the origin from a point
along the ray of equality in the positive orthant of income space with n = 3.
Any allocation of a given total income, which we normalise to unity, can
be represented as a point in the simplex illustrated in Figure 1. If we take
an arbitrary initial income vector then the six possible permutations give
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the vertices of the irregular hexagonal shape shown in the Figure. As is well
known, the convex hull of these six points represents the set of income vectors
which, permuted into appropriate order, Lorenz dominate the initial income
vector.
Now consider which set of points, appropriately permuted, ratio dominate
the initial vector. Ratios between incomes for any two individuals are con-
stant throughout planes containing the third axis, and these planes intersect
the simplex along rays passing through its vertices. Points of greater equality
between these two are those lying between such rays and the bisecting ray
through the same vertex. Hence the area in which all ratios are nearer to
unity is the star-shaped8 area outlined in bold within the Lorenz hexagon.
Since this ¯ts inside the hexagon, coinciding only at its vertices, it is dia-
grammatically plain that ratio dominance implies without being implied by
Lorenz dominance in comparisons of vectors with equal means.
Di®erences between any two incomes are maintained in planes which cut
the simplex along lines perpendicular to its sides. Hence, constructing, as
in the ratio based case, an area in which all di®erences are diminished gives
the inverted Y-shape outlined with dots inside the hexagon. Again this
¯ts entirely inside the Lorenz hexagon except at its vertices. It contains
however some points inside and some outside the ratio-based star shape (the
areas shaded on the diagram), demonstrating that neither ratio nor di®erence
dominance implies the other.
2.2 Welfare
Dalton's conviction that progressive transfers reduce welfare was motivated
by the recognition that if social welfare was the sum of individual utilities
which depend only on own income and do so in a concave fashion then such
transfers raise social welfare. In comparisons between vectors with equal total
income Lorenz dominance can be identi¯ed with improvement in utilitarian
social welfare (Hardy, Littlewood and P¶ olya 1934, Atkinson 1970). We can
extend this observation to comparisons involving vectors with di®erent means
by de¯ning a generalisation of Lorenz dominance.
De¯nition 9 (a) Say that x generalised Lorenz dominates y, written x %GL
8The coincidence between the name of the star-shaped ordering and the shape of the
¯gure is purely fortuitous. The origin of the name lies in the connection with star-shaped
functions, as explained below.
92.2 Welfare 2 DOMINANCE ORDERINGS
 
Figure 1: Dominance orderings illustrated in the standard simplex
y, i®
Pk
i=1[xi ¡ yi] ¸ 0 and x; y 2 Dn (Kolm 1969; Shorrocks 1983).
(b) Say that Fx %GL Fy, i®
R q
0 [»x(p) ¡ »y(p)]dp ¸ 0 for all q 2 [0;1] and
»x; »y 2 D
This ordering is called supermajorisation in the noneconomic context
(Marshall and Olkin 1979). Kolm does not use the term generalised Lorenz
dominance but refers to a social preference for distributions which gener-
alised Lorenz dominate others as isophily. Generalised Lorenz dominance
is also strongly linked to utilitarian social welfare. Suppose social welfare
W : Dn ! R is the sum of individual utilities which are continuous, increas-
ing, concave functions of individual incomes, ui : R ! R. Clearly x %GL y
implies W(x) ¸ W(y). In fact W(x) ¸ W(y) for all social welfare functions
with these properties i® x %GL y (Kolm 1969, Marshall and Olkin 1979,
Shorrocks 1983).
What, though, if utilities are not formed in a purely self regarding way?
Suppose individual utilities ui(xi;x¡exi) depend not only on own income but
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also on the gaps between own income and the incomes of others9. For exam-
ple, suppose individual utilities have the form ui(xi;x) = Ài(xi)+Ã(xi+1¡xi)
where Ài has the usual continuous, increasing and concave properties but Ã is
strongly enough decreasing. It is easy to construct an example where a pro-
gressive transfer in the middle of the income distribution does not increase
social welfare because of the harm done to the utilities of individuals with in-
comes below the recipient of the transfer. In such a context an absolute lower
end elevation, however, would always still increases social welfare because no
income would fall and no gap increase.
Lower end elevations are the natural basis for welfare comparisons corre-
sponding to the di®erence and ratio dominance orderings.
Let us de¯ne two orderings which correspond to income changes which
should unambiguously increase social welfare even if income gaps matter to
individual well being.
De¯nition 10 (a) Say that x%
¤
Ay i® xi+1¡xi · yi+1¡yi; i = 1;:::;n¡1
and xn ¸ yn with x; y 2 Dn.
(b) Say that x %¤
R y i® ln(xi+1)¡ln(xi) · ln(yi+1)¡ln(yi); i = 1;:::;n¡1
and xn ¸ yn for x; y 2 Dn
+.
These say that no element in the vector is reduced and either all absolute
or all relative gaps are reduced. The link to lower end elevations is obvious.
Theorem 3 (a) x %¤
A y i® x can be obtained from y by a ¯nite series of
absolute lower end elevations.
(b) x %¤
R y i® x can be obtained from y by a ¯nite series of relative lower
end elevations.
These criteria for welfare comparison are plainly stronger than generalised
Lorenz dominance since all partial sums of income are obviously increased
by changes which raise all incomes.
9This sort of dependence is sometimes referred to as envy but that is a somewhat
tendentious term, envy, one of the seven deadly sins, being condemned in most ethical
codes. The term envy is suggestive of a wish to bring down the incomes of those better
o®. It need not be supposed that such sentiments are necessarily implied by demoralisation
arising from accentuated feelings of social inferiority - indeed the perception that those on
higher incomes deserve the high social position that one can not attain may be precisely
the source of deterioration in psychological well being.
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Theorem 4 If x %¤
A y or x %¤
R y then x%
GLy
We can also de¯ne similar orderings over distribution functions for which
similar links will hold.
De¯nition 11 (a) Say that Fx %¤
A Fy i® »x(p)¡»y(p) is nondecreasing for
p 2 [0;1], »x(1) ¸ »y(1) and »x; »y 2 D
(b) Say that Fx %¤
A Fy i® ln(»x(p)) ¡ ln(»y(p)) is nondecreasing for p 2
[0;1], »x(1) ¸ »y(1) and »x; »y 2 D+
3 Inequality and welfare indices
We have seen that progressive transfers increase the sum of concave functions
of the individual elements in the vector. The class of functions de¯ned on
the vector which are such that they rise with progressive transfers is a wider
class than this, ¯rst studied by Schur (1923) and known as Schur convex
functions. Schur convex functions are those which are said to preserve the
Lorenz order. A decreasing function of a Schur convex function is said to
be Schur concave. If Lorenz dominance is felt to be a convincing criterion
for judging inequality then this is the natural class of functions to use for
measuring inequality and most measures proposed for this purpose do fall
into this class (although there are notable exceptions such as the variance
of logarithms which is infamously not Schur concave, as discussed in Foster
and Ok 1999). Similarly if generalised Lorenz dominance is felt to be a
suitable criterion for judging social welfare improvement then measures of
social welfare ought to rise with progressive transfers and therefore to be
Schur convex, besides having other properties such as being increasing in all
incomes.
In this section of the paper we discuss the classes of functions of income
vectors and distributions which preserve the orderings de¯ned above based
on income gaps. We start by de¯ning formally what it means for a function
to preserve an ordering.
De¯nition 12
Say that a function Á : X ! R preserves an ordering % i® Á(x) ¸ Á(y)
whenever x % y, x; y 2 X.
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We consider functions which are di®erentiable. For this purpose we need
a notion of derivative for a mapping de¯ned on a space of functions. Specif-
ically, suppose Á : DC ! R is a functional de¯ned on the space of quan-
tile functions. Then we assume the existence of a functional derivative10
±Á : [0;1] ! R with the property that
R
±Á Ãdp = d
d²Á(» + ²´) j²=0 for
» 2 DC and di®erentiable functions ´ : [0;1] ! R.
3.1 Inequality
Functions which preserve the ratio and di®erence dominance orderings are
characterised in the following result.
Theorem 5 (a) A di®erentiable function Á : Dn ! R preserves %A i® Pk
i=1
@




@xiÁ(x) = 0 (Marshall,
Walkup and Wets 1967).
(b) A di®erentiable function Á : Dn









@xiÁ(x) = 0 (Marshall, Walkup and
Wets 1967).
(c) A di®erentiable function11 Á : DC ! R preserves %A i®
R q
0 ±Á dp ¸ 0
for q < 1 and
R 1
0 ±Á dp = 0
(d) A di®erentiable function Á : DC
+ ! R preserves %R i®
R q
0 » ±Á dp ¸ 0
for q < 1 and
R 1
0 » ±Á dp = 0
Proof of Theorem 5.
10Suppose that Á extends continuously to a function on the space of all continuous
functions on the unit interval. Since this is a Banach space under suitable norm k ¢ k we
could then, for example, take ±Á to be the Fr¶ echet derivative de¯ned by
lim
´!0
kÁ(» + ´) ¡ Á(») ¡ ±Á(»)k
k´k
= 0:
11The assumption that the quantile function is di®erentiable or even continuous, implicit
in the stated domain for Á, is probably stronger than needed. However, given the use made
of integration by parts in the proof, it would be necessary to introduce a generalisation of
the notion of derivative for », and a careful treatment of the issues involved is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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(a) If x %A y then we can get from y to x by a ¯nite series of lower end




@xiÁ(x) ¸ 0 for k = 1;:::;n¡





the translation leaves it una®ected.




@xiÁ(x) = 0 since, for any ¸, x %A x+¸en and




@xiÁ(x) ¸ 0 as Á must increase
with any lower end elevation.
(b) Obvious, noting that ratio dominance is just di®erence dominance in
logarithms.
(c) If Fx %A Fy then »x = »y ¡ ´ where ´ 2 DC. For any ´ 2 DC, we have
d
d²



















Since, for any ¸ 2 R, Fx %A Fy and Fy %A Fx if »x = »y ¡¸e, we must
have
R 1
0 ±Á dp = 0. Then
d
d²










and for this to be positive for all increasing ´ requires
R q
0 ±Á dp ¸ 0 for
all q.
(d) Obvious, noting that ratio dominance is just di®erence dominance in
logarithms.
The results for orderings on Rn were derived by Marshall, Walkup and
Wets (1967), although the proof and the interpretation here are quite di®er-
ent.
The classes of indices derived here are obviously broader than that of







Functions appropriate as indices of inequality are, of course, those which
preserve the reverse orderings, -A and -R, and indices which preserve -R
but not -L
R include, for example, the variance of logarithms.
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3.2 Welfare
Just as progressive transfers raise welfare as well as reducing inequality, we
consider welfare functions which are increased by lower end elevations.




@xiÁ(x) ¸ 0 for k = 1;:::;n ¡ 1.
(b) A di®erentiable function Á : Dn






0 for k = 1;:::;n ¡ 1 (Marshall, Walkup and Wets 1967).
(c) A di®erentiable function Á : DC ! R preserves %¤
A i®
R q
0 ±Á dp ¸ 0 for
q < 1
(d) A di®erentiable function Á : DC
+ ! R preserves %¤
R i®
R q
0 » ±Á dp ¸ 0
for q < 1
Proof of Theorem 6.
(a) If x %¤
A y then we can get from y to x by a ¯nite series of lower end





0 for k = 1;:::;n ¡ 1.
(b) Obvious, noting that ratio dominance is just di®erence dominance in
logarithms.
(c) If Fx %¤























For this to be positive for all increasing ´ requires
R q
0 ±Á dp ¸ 0 for all
q.
(d) Obvious, noting that ratio dominance is just di®erence dominance in
logarithms.
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Again these results are partly anticipated by Marshall, Walkup and Wets
(1967) though the treatment is quite di®erent.
The conditions for functions to preserve the welfare orderings di®er only
from those to preserve the equality orderings in that the requirements for
invariance to translation and rescaling are dropped. The requirement for
nonnegativity of partial sums of derivatives remains. Functions which pre-
serve %¤
A and %¤
R need not be increasing in all incomes but must increase
with positive translations and scalings up of incomes, respectively.
There is a tradition of linking inequality indices with measurement of
social welfare going back at least to Dalton (1920) and exempli¯ed by Kolm
(1969), Atkinson (1970) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1978, 1980, 1984).
To expound the key results here we need to de¯ne properties of functions
implying certain sorts of response to translations and rescalings. Let e 2 DC
+
denote the quantile function which is constant at unity.
De¯nition 13 (a) A di®erentiable function Á : Dn ! R is translatable i®
there exists an increasing function g : R ! R and a function Ã : Dn !
R such that Á = g(Ã(x)) and Ã(x + ¸en) = Ã(x) + ¸.
(b) A di®erentiable function Á : Dn
+ ! R is homothetic i® there exists an
increasing function g : R ! R and a function Ã : Dn
+ ! R such that
Á = g(Ã(x)) and Ã(¸x) = ¸Ã(x).
(c) A di®erentiable function Á : DC ! R is translatable i® there exists an
increasing function g : R ! R and a function Ã : Dn ! R such that
Á = g(Ã(»)) and Ã(» + ¸e) = Ã(») + ¸.
(d) A di®erentiable function Á : DC
+ ! R is homothetic i® there exists an
increasing function g : R ! R and a function Ã : Dn
+ ! R such that
Á = g(Ã(»)) and Ã(¸») = ¸Ã(»).
The notion of the equally distributed equivalent income function due to
Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970) is a crucial one in this literature. For
comparisons of vectors de¯ne this as Â : Dn ! R by Á(Â(x)en) = Á(x)
and for comparisons of distribution functions de¯ne it as Â : DC ! R by
Á(Â(»x)e) = Á(»x). Clearly Â preserves the same orderings as does Á. If
Á is Schur convex and translatable then subtracting Â from mean income
gives an index which is Schur concave and invariant to translation. If Á is
Schur convex and homothetic then the proportional di®erence between mean
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income and Â gives an index which is Schur concave and invariant to rescaling.
In the ¯rst case we have an absolute inequality index linked to measurement
of welfare and in the latter a relative inequality index - both ideas are fund
in Kolm (1969) and developed by later authors (Atkinson 1970, Blackorby
and Donaldson 1978, 1980, 1984).
Given that progressive transfers leave mean incomes unchanged it is nat-
ural to construct inequality indices intended to preserve the Lorenz ordering
by comparison to mean income but this will not work if the index is in-
tended to preserve the orderings based on gaps. Lower end elevations do not
leave mean income unchanged. However we can construct suitable indices by
comparison to the maximum income.
Theorem 7 (a) If a di®erentiable function Á : Dn ! R is translatable and
preserves %¤
A then µ(x) = xn ¡ Â(x) preserves -A.
(b) If a di®erentiable function Á : Dn
+ ! R is homothetic and preserves %¤
R
then µ(x) = 1 ¡ Â(x)=xn preserves -R.
(c) If a di®erentiable function Á : DC ! R is translatable and preserves
%¤
A then µ(») = »(1) ¡ Â(») preserves -A.
(d) If a di®erentiable function Á : DC
+ ! R is homothetic and preserves %¤
R
then µ(») = 1 ¡ Â(»)=»(1) preserves -R.
Proof of Theorem 7.














(b) If Á is homothetic then Â(¸x) = ¸Â(x) so that µ(¸x) = µ(x) and Pn
i=1
@










(c) If Á is translatable then Â(» + ¸e) = Â(») + ¸ so that µ(» + ¸e) = µ(»)
and
R 1
0 ±µ dp = 0. For q < 1,
R q
0 ±µ dp = ¡
R q
0 ±Á dp · 0.
(d) If Á is homothetic then Â(¸») = ¸Â(») so that µ(¸») = µ(») and R 1
0 » ±µ dp = 0. For q < 1,
R q
0 » ±µ dp = ¡
R q
0 » ±Á dp · 0.
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Thus we have a way of constructing inequality indices preserving ratio and
di®erence dominance orderings from social welfare measures with appropriate
properties.
To take the simplest example, if social welfare is measured by the homo-




which is invariant to progressive transfers and therefore yields no interesting
Schur concave inequality measure, then the construction just outlined gives
measures xn ¡ ¹ x = 1
n
Pn




mean absolute and relative shortfall from the top income, which do preserve
-A and -R respectively.
A social welfare function which is translatable, homothetic and strictly
Schur convex is Á(x) = 2
n(n+1)
Pn
i=1(n ¡ i)xi. The Kolm (1969) procedure
gives a relative inequality index 1 ¡ Â(x)=¹ x = G = 2
n(n+1)¹ x
Pn
i=1 i[xi ¡ ¹ x]
equal to the well-known Gini coe±cient. The procedure outlined above gives




G¹ x=xn ¡ 3[1 ¡ ¹ x=xn] for large n. There exist, though, functions which are
Schur convex yet preserve the gap based inequality orderings. Take the
social welfare function Á(x) = 2
n(n+1)
Pn
i=1 ixi. This is Schur concave yet
1 ¡ Â(x)=xn = 2
n(n+1)xn
Pn
i=1 i[xn ¡ xi] is still an inequality measure consis-
tent with -R.
4 Inequality-reducing policies
Often the purpose to which the inequality orderings are to be put is to com-
pare outcomes under two policy regimes in which incomes are determined by
di®erent mappings from some underlying source of variation. For such cases,
general results can be derived relating the properties of these mappings to the
resulting gaps. Let us assume the underlying variation is in a single dimension
and denote the variable in question by z 2 R, distributed according to Fz,
drawn from a class of distribution functions F. The outcomes of interest in
the two regimes are denoted x and y, where x = Áx(z;Fz) and y = Áy(z;Fz)
with Áx : R£F ! R and Áy : R£F ! R continuous and increasing in their
¯rst arguments. Then »x(p) = Áx(»z(p)) and »y(p) = Áy(»z(p)).
Theorem 8 (a) If x = Áx(z;Fz), y = Áy(z;Fz) with Áx : R £ F ! R and
Áy : R£F ! R continuous and increasing in their ¯rst arguments then
the following are equivalent
184 INEQUALITY-REDUCING POLICIES
(i) Fx %A Fy for all Fz 2 F
(ii) Áx(z;Fz) = g(Áy(z;Fz);Fz) for some function g : R £ F ! R
such that, for all Fz 2 F, g(Áy(»z(p);Fz);Fz) ¡ Áy(»z(p);Fz) is
nonincreasing in p for all p 2 [0;1]
(b) If x = Áx(z;Fz), y = Áy(z;Fz) with Áx : R£F ! R+ and Áy : R£F !
R+ continuous and increasing in their ¯rst arguments the following are
equivalent
(i) Fx %R Fy for all Fz 2 F
(ii) Áx(z;Fz) = g(Áy(z;Fz);Fz) for some function g : R+ £ F !
R+ such that, for all Fz 2 F, g(Áy(»z(p);Fz);Fz)=Áy(»z(p);Fz) is
nonincreasing in p for all p 2 [0;1]
Proof of Theorem 8.
(a) Su±ciency of the condition in (ii) for Fx %A Fy for all Fz 2 F is
obvious.
If, for some Fz 2 F, Áx(z;Fz) is not a function of Áy(z;Fz) then
there exist p0;p1 2 [0;1] with p1 > p0, such that Áy(»x(p0);Fz) <
Áy(»z(p1);Fz) but Áx(»z(p0);Fz) 6= Áx(»z(p1);Fz). Then it cannot be
that, for z distributed as Fz, »x(p) ¡ »y(p) is nonincreasing in p for
p 2 [p0;p1].
If Áx(z;Fz) is a function of Áy(z;Fz) but there is an Fz and p1 > p0
such that g(Áy(»z(p1);Fz);Fz)¡Áy(»z(p1);Fz) > g(Áy(»z(p0);Fz);Fz)¡
Áy(»z(p0);Fz) then again it cannot be that, for z distributed as Fz,
»x(p) ¡ »y(p) is nonincreasing in p for p 2 [p0;p1].
(b) Obvious given ratio dominance is di®erence dominance in logarithms.
Functions g : R ! R such that g(x)=x is increasing are called star-shaped
(Bruckner and Ostrow 1962). If the functions Áx and Áy are di®erentiable in
z then the conditions in the theorem reduce to a comparison of derivatives or
elasticities - speci¯cally, g(x;Fz) ¡ x is decreasing in x i® @g=@x is less than
unity and g(x;Fz)=x is decreasing in x i® @ lng=@ lnx is less than unity.
If the functions Áx and Áy are additively or multiplicatively separated
then the role of Fz becomes irrelevant. Finding distributions Fz such that
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dominance fails in either direction is less restricted and the theorem can
be extended to cover not only the inequality orderings based on gaps but
also Lorenz dominance. In particular, suppose F includes all distributions
with support within Z, x = Áx(z)Ãx(Fz), y = Áy(z)Ãy(Fz) and Áx(z) =
g(Áy(z)) with g(z)=z increasing over an interval ¹ Z µ Z then we can ¯nd a
counterexample in which there is ratio dominance in the reverse direction by
choosing Fz with support wholly within ¹ Z. Since ratio dominance implies
relative Lorenz dominance then this means g(z)=z falling everywhere is a
necessary condition not only for di®erence dominance but also for Lorenz
dominance to hold for all Fz 2 F.
Theorem 9 (a) If x = Áx(z)+Ãx(Fz), y = Áy(z)+Ãy(Fz) with Áx : R ! R
and Áy : R ! R continuous and increasing and Ãx : F ! R and
Ãy : F ! R then the following are equivalent
(i) Fx %A Fy for all Fz with support in Z
(ii) Fx %L
A Fy for all Fz with support in Z
(iii) Áx(z) = g(Áy(z)) for some function g : R ! R such that g(x) ¡ x
is nonincreasing in x for all x 2 g(Z)
(b) If x = Áx(z)Ãx(Fz), y = Áy(z)Ãy(Fz) with Áx : R ! R+ and Áy : R !
R+ continuous and increasing and Ãx : F ! R+ and Ãy : F ! R+
then the following are equivalent
(i) Fx %R Fy for all Fz with support in Z
(ii) Fx %L
R Fy for all Fz with support in Z
(iii) Áx(z) = g(Áy(z)) for some function g : R ! R such that g(x)=x
is nonincreasing in x for all x 2 g(Z)
For Ãx = Ãy = 1, the second part of this theorem is the result of Jakobsson
(1976). Su±ciency of the condition on g for Fx %L
R Fy to hold for all Fz was
recognised by Fellman (1976) and Kakwani (1977). Eichhorn, Funke and
Richter (1984) and Arnold (1987) extend this result to drop the assumption
that Áx and Áy are continuous and increasing.
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4.1 Applications
4.1.1 Progressive taxation and inequality
Fixed pretax incomes Suppose z denotes pretax incomes, assumed dis-
tributed in a way una®ected by taxation. Let the tax function be ¿(z) so
that posttax incomes are z ¡ ¿(z). By Theorem 9 the posttax distribution
absolute Lorenz dominates and di®erence dominates the pretax distribution
whatever Fz i® ¿(z) is increasing in z which is to say that marginal tax rates
are everywhere positive (Moyes 1988). This is a property that Fei (1981)
calls minimal progression.
The posttax distribution relative Lorenz dominates and ratio dominates
the pretax distribution whatever Fz i® ¿(z)=z is increasing in z which is to
say that marginal tax rates are everywhere above average tax rates. This
is the property usually characterised as progression. The posttax distribu-
tion dominates the pretax distribution i® the tax is progressive in the sense
of taking a greater share of the incomes of the rich all the way along the
distribution. This result, proved for example in Jakobsson (1976), captures
an old idea. Seligman (1894) dates the ¯rst recorded occurrence of progres-
sive taxation to Solonic Athens and the ¯rst written recognition that it "will
lessen the disparity of fortunes" to Guiccardini's sixteenth century discussion
of Florentine taxation, reprinted in Guicciardini (1932)12.
One tax system will reduce inequality further than another, in the sense
of relative Lorenz dominance and ratio dominance, i® the elasticity of posttax
income to pretax income - known as residual income progression (Musgrave
and Thin 1948) - is everywhere lower. This is among the results due to
Jakobsson (1976)13. Suppose we have a linear tax on pretax income, ¿(z) =
tz¡G so that posttax income is z(1¡t)+G. Then the elasticity is z
z+G=(1¡t)
so an increase in t reduces inequality.
12This is not to say, of course, that one can date this far back recognition of formal
criteria for inequality comparison and their relation to properties of the tax system but
Guiccardini does say, for example, in discussing the advantages of a particular progressive
tax structure that \so doing, not only shall such bene¯ts follow as I have said, but also the
ranks of each shall be equally preserved, since we are all citizens of the same rank, and thus
all shall become truly equal as we reasonably should be" (\E cos¶ ³ faccendo, non sole ne
seguiranno tante utilit¶ a e tanti beni che ho io detto, ma ancora si conserver¶ a equalmente el
grado di ognuno, perch¶ e tutti siamo cittadini e di uno medesimo grado, e cos¶ ³ diventereno
tutti veramente pari, come ragionevolmente dobbiamo essere." (ibid. p.206).
13Keen, Papapanagos and Shorrocks (2000) extend Jakobsson's results to cover the case
where taxes on certain ranges of income are zero.
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Fixed pretax wages Changes in taxation change work incentives and
therefore the distribution of earnings given a ¯xed distribution of wages.
The inequality-reducing e®ect of progressive taxation is less obvious in such a
context. However the same theorems still provide the tools for assessing nec-
essary and su±cient conditions for reduction in the inequality of incomes14.
Let z now denote wages, distributed again according to Fz 2 F. Let
individual hours of work be h and taxes be ¿(zh) so that posttax income
is zh ¡ ¿(zh) assuming no other source of income. Chosen hours under the
given tax system, h = ´(z), may decline with wage but we assume at least
that posttax income does not, z´0(z)(1¡¿0(z´(z)) > 0 - the so-called Mirrlees
condition.
Then, by Theorem 9, the posttax distribution under one tax system
Lorenz dominates and ratio dominates that under another i® the elastic-
ity of posttax income to the wage is lower at each wage. This elasticity is the
product of residual income progression at z´(z) and one plus the elasticity of
hours ´(z) to z (wherever ´(z) > 0). Two new considerations emerge when
considering the impact of a progressive tax change. Firstly, labour supply
responses may make the distribution of earnings less equal. Secondly, even
if residual income progression falls at each level of earnings, labour supply
responses could move individuals into less progressive parts of the tax system
so that residual income progression need not fall at each wage rate.
As an example, consider the case of CES preferences with a linear tax,
¿(zh) = tzh ¡ G. Posttax incomes are
¯z¾(1 ¡ t)¾




z(1 ¡ t) + ¯z¾(1 ¡ t)¾ +
z
z + G=(1 ¡ t)
An increase in t reduces the second term but increases the ¯rst and there is
no guarantee that the expression as a whole falls. Preston (1990b) shows that
this possible for parameter values which are not unreasonable. In principle,
there exist distributions of pretax wages such that inequality is not reduced.
14We should be wary of linking changes in income inequality to welfare in this context
since individual wellbeing depends on both income and hours.
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4.1.2 Immigration and inequality
To take a slightly di®erent example, consider the e®ect of immigration on
income inequality in the preexisting resident population of a country. Sup-
pose what is now ¯xed is the distribution of productive abilities, z 2 [0;1],
distributed in the resident population of size N according to Fz.
The economy employs n(z) workers of type z to produce a single type
of output according to a CES technology whereby output is [
R 1
0 zn(z)¾dz]1=¾
with ¾ < 1. This output is traded internationally at a ¯xed world price which
we normalise to 1. Demand for labour of type z is determined by equating









Prior to immigration, this de¯nes an equilibrium wage distribution equat-
ing demand for labour of type z to its supply, n(z) = Nfz(z). For this to
involve wages increasing in z requires that we restrict attention to distribu-
tions Fz such that 1 + (¾ ¡ 1)@ lnfz(z)=@ lnz > 0 everywhere15.
Now assume that there is immigration of M = mN workers with abil-
ity distributed according to distribution function Iz with density iz. The
economy reaches a new equilibrium at which the ratio of new to old wages
at labour type z is (1 + miz(z)=fz(z))¾¡1. Theorem 8 can be applied. The
distribution of wages across preexisting resident workers is made more equal,
in the sense of ratio dominance, whatever Fz i® immigration policy is such
as to guarantee iz(z)=fz(z) is increasing at all z so that immigrants are more
concentrated in higher earning groups than the in the population already
resident.
5 Conclusion
This paper has drawn attention to and argued a case for the interest of
inequality orderings based explicitly on closing up of income gaps. Drawing
15If this condition were to fail then it would be appropriate to alter the de¯nition of
equilibrium rather than to assume wage might be decreasing in z. Assuming workers of
higher ability can do the jobs of less able workers then a sensible de¯nition of equilibrium
would equate demand for labour of type z and above to supply of such labour and the
equilibrium wage distribution over and around ranges of ability where the condition fails
would have °at sections. We assume away this complication here.
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where necessary on earlier papers, the links between these and other orderings
have been outlined, the classes of functions preserving the orderings has been
characterised and applications have been presented showing their useful in
comparison of economic policies.
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